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The so-called freedom of movement granted to EU citizens has made it easier for 
economically deprived EU citizens to seek their livelihood beyond the borders of 
their homelands and this has created one of our time’s most socially excluded 
groups. In Sweden, over the recent years they have come to be known as 
vulnerable EU citizens. This article analyses what happens when there are no 
unified regulations as to how Swedish municipalities should prevent social 
exclusion among those who are not Swedish citizens. Our purpose is to study 
how officials and politicians normalize certain beliefs with regard to the 
(im)possibility of providing support to socially-excluded EU citizens residing in 
their municipalities. The material used in the study is interviews with officials and 
politicians in Västernorrland, a region of northern Sweden. The study shows that 
in the absence of common guidelines the normalization of Swedish citizenship 
has taken place as the basis of the rights to welfare. It is Swedish citizenship that 
provides you with access to the community; at the same time, it is this community 
which must be guarded. Prohibition of EU citizens is commonly legitimized by a 
concern for the municipality’s citizens as if the closing down of the settlements 
makes social exclusion seize to exist or at least seize to be a problem for the 
municipalities. This narrative illustrates that it is the settlements and their flaws, 
rather than the inhabitants’ social exclusion in a broader context that are perceived 
as problematic. 
Introduction 
One of our time’s most socially excluded groups, at least among those we see 
in the Swedish society, consists of those that have come to be known over 
recent years as EU migrants or vulnerable EU citizens. The so-called freedom of 
movement granted to EU citizens has made it easier for economically 
deprived EU citizens to seek their livelihood beyond the borders of their 
homelands — including here in Sweden. Many of them come from Bulgaria 
or Rumania and live as homeless in the public spaces of Swedish cities. A 
problem arises in that there are no unified regulations as to how Swedish 
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municipalities should prevent this social exclusion among those who are not 
Swedish citizens. The division of responsibility with regard to providing 
support to these people is a matter of debate. Generally, in Sweden the State 
acts as the distributor of social support and it is normally perceived that the 
welfare state does not extend beyond its borders. In order to describe which 
group we refer to using the term vulnerable EU citizen1. We use the same 
definition as that was defined in the Swedish Government Official Report 
(SOU 2016:6) in which they are defined as “individuals who are citizens of 
another EU country and do not have a Swedish residence permit”. We choose 
to use the term vulnerable EU citizen despite the fact that the group is 
popularly perceived as consisting solely of Roma. Although a large proportion 
of those who belong to the group vulnerable EU citizens are indeed Roma, 
this is not universally the case. However, in order to understand the situation, 
it is not possible to ignore the fact those persons who are categorized as 
vulnerable EU citizens are also in most cases categorized as Roma and that 
the category therefore accommodates (and partially conceals) a long history 
of antiziganism, persecution and discrimination (Steward 2012, Troc 2005). 
The purpose of this chapter is to study how officials and politicians 
normalize certain beliefs with regard to the (im)possibility of providing 
support to socially-excluded EU citizens residing in their municipalities. The 
material used in the study is based on interviews with officials and politicians 
in Västernorrland, a region of northern Sweden consisting of seven 
municipalities (Ek et al. 2017). One of the most prominent images presented 
by the material is that there is very little room for solidarity and humanitarian 
efforts in the context of municipal administration and that the simplest 
solution from the point of view of these municipalities would be if there were 
no vulnerable EU citizens. Thus far, we can certainly all agree — it would 
indeed be wonderful if nobody was required to live under such trying 
circumstances. Unfortunately, such is not the case and, even if vulnerable EU 
citizens were to leave the Swedish municipalities, their situation would not 
necessarily take a turn for the better. 
Socially vulnerable EU citizens in Sweden 
With the advent of freedom of movement within the European 
Union, the Swedish interpretation of the EU regulations is that EU citizens 
have the right to reside in Sweden for up to three months without a residence 
                                                 
1 We have chosen to consequently use the term vulnerable EU citizen throughout this report, 
although a number of different designations are used to refer to the target group, both 
colloquially and in policy documents, newspaper articles and interview material. 
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permit (SOU 2016:6). If, as an EU citizen, one wishes to remain longer and 
obtain a residence permit, it is necessary to either have work, to be a registered 
job-seeker, a student or to have adequate funds to support oneself or to have 
full health insurance (www.europa.eu). Unfortunately, very few vulnerable 
EU citizens meet these requirements and consequently they do not have the 
right to remain in Sweden for longer than three months. 
It is difficult to estimate how many vulnerable EU citizens are resident 
in Sweden at any given time but according to the official governmental report 
(SOU 2016:6) it is said that during the spring of 2014, there were 
approximately 2,100 vulnerable EU citizens in Sweden, rising to 4,700 during 
autumn 2015 before declining during 2016. That the presence of vulnerable 
EU citizens on the streets of almost all Swedish towns and cities has declined 
has many explanations but, simply because beggars are no longer such a 
common sight outside Sweden’s shops and public buildings, it does not mean 
that the number of vulnerable citizens has decreased. They are merely 
elsewhere; either within or outside Sweden. One common explanation often 
cited as to why vulnerable EU citizens have become less of a fixture of our 
urban landscape is that there has been “a hardening of the social climate”. 
This means that municipalities increasingly choose to evict EU citizens and 
prosecute them for setting up illegal camps, as well as the recommendation of 
the Swedish Government Official Report (Valfridsson 2016) that people 
should stop giving money to beggars and instead give financial support to 
organizations working for Roma rights in Bulgaria and Romania. The social 
democratic party decided on the congress in April 2017 that there is a need 
for a larger responsibility from the EU regarding this issue and that it is 
“unworthy” to be forced to make a living as a beggar. They also decided that 
there is a need for regulations that makes it easier to evict settlements and that 
is should be illegal to earn money on someone else begging 
(www.socialdemokraterna.se). EU citizens themselves testify that they now 
receive less money and are exposed to physical and psychological harassment 
and assault (Sydsvenskan newspaper 01.10.2016). Added to this is the 
situation arising from the refugee situation of autumn 2015, after which the 
Swedish Government chose to impose a stricter interpretation of the right to 
asylum, with the subsequent imposition of border controls. This has made it 
more difficult for all refugees to enter the country, including vulnerable EU 
citizens. Swedish authorities have also taken a harder line, with the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR)2 contending that EU 
citizens have no right to enjoy the Swedish safety net. This means, among 
other things, that they have no right to social security payments and that 
2 The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions is an employer and interest 
organization for all of Sweden’s municipalities, county councils and regions. 
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Swedish municipalities are not obliged to offer school to vulnerable EU 
citizens that are children. However, social services are permitted to take the 
children of EU citizens into care where they are at acute risk of suffering harm; 
a situation in which the municipality in which the child resides has a specific 
responsibility (Swedish Social Services Act 2001:453). SALAR also states that 
municipalities are at liberty to use their right to establish bylaws in order to 
prohibit begging (Agnevik & Danielsson 2014). 
The issue with vulnerable EU citizens is involving a number of 
national and local authorities but the issue is often referred to as belonging to 
the social services, at the national or local level. The social service in the 
municipalities is regulated by the National Board of Health and Welfare but 
is free to make local interpretations as to how to implement the regulations. 
Therefore the National Board of Health and Welfare’s is one example of how 
Swedish authorities interpret their scope for action with regard to EU citizens. 
They state that it does not lie within the remit of municipal social services to 
meet the physical needs of EU citizens. Certain exception may arise with 
regard to emergencies and, in certain cases, contributions to travelling back to 
their homeland. From the perspective of the welfare state’s responsibility and 
room for manoeuvre, it is therefore of interest to study how the 
Västernorrland municipalities view the presence of vulnerable EU citizens, 
how they have chosen to deal with the issue and their reasoning with regard 
to social exclusion and the responsibility of municipalities3. This says 
something about the contingent dilemma facing the welfare state and the 
manner in which officials navigate in such a context. 
As vulnerable EU citizens fall outside of the necessary criteria used to 
access the right of citizens, they have no right to receive financial assistance 
or social welfare — leaving them entirely outside of the Swedish welfare state. 
SALAR makes the interpretation that according to the Social Services Act, a 
municipality has a responsibility as the place of domicile of those staying in 
the municipality but who are not Swedish citizens. According to the Act, as 
the place of domicile, a municipality only has responsibility for responding to 
acute situations and for the provision of emergency assistance, meaning that 
an individual who is not a permanent resident of the municipality does not 
have any right to income support (Agnevik & Danielsson 2014). The Act also 
                                                 
3 In a Swedish context, the responsibility of municipalities is of particular importance as 
Sweden, despite being a unitary state, has both a strong central state apparatus and extensive 
municipal self-government. Sweden’s municipalities, county councils and regions are part of 
a multilevel system in as much as Sweden is a member of the EU. As Sweden has delegated 
certain powers to the EU, municipalities are embedded in various ways in a system in which 
what a municipality may or may not do is also formed by EU institutions, something which 
also applies to socio-political areas in which the EU has no unified social policy 
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states that where it is possible for the embassy of the person’s homeland to 
assist its citizens, the place of domicile shall assist with funds to travel to the 
embassy/consulate in Sweden, although in specific cases the place of domicile 
may provide funds for a journey to the homeland itself.  
Normalisation, privilege and exclusion — a theoretical setting 
In our analysis, we have chosen to use the term normalisation as a 
central concept in investigating and, at the same time, challenging those 
processes that in a Swedish welfare-state context have come to define what is 
considered “normal” (Fahlgren et al. 2011; 2016). Such processes of 
normalisation covertly create both inclusion and privileged positions (e.g. 
white, man, Swedish, middle class) while at the same time producing 
inequality, discrimination and oppression based on the power structures 
inherent in categories such as gender, race/ethnicity and class (Giritli Nygren 
et al. 2015). Taking previous studies on normalisation and exclusion as a point 
of departure, this provides some form of setting for the perspective taken in 
analysing the results obtained. By facilitating an analysis of what is taken for 
granted and naturalised in the discourse — in this case on vulnerable EU 
citizens — normalisation becomes a useful term for investigating how 
inequality and oppression is created and maintained in organisations and 
society as a whole. 
When Foucault describes how “the normal” as a discursive 
construction has become a new power structure, joining the ranks of 
previously established societal power structures, he points to how, during the 
nineteenth century, the terms norm and normality bring something new to 
our way of thinking about ourselves and how we relate to one another. He 
shows how phenomena such as norms and normality are not a given and that 
it is possible to uncover how they emerge within those relationships of power 
that arrange our world (Foucault 2008). This also makes the study of these 
phenomena part of this arrangement, as it becomes involved in issues relating 
to the nature of politics and ethics, both with regard to how they are formed 
and how they might be transformed. The terms norm and normality are thus 
central to an understanding of processes of normalization in as much as they 
combine scientific, technical and political notions of what constitutes the 
individual and the community and how these work. It is therefore of interest 
to discover which preconceptions exist regarding vulnerable EU citizens and 
how these should be understood. 
In his groundbreaking study of norms and the normal, Canguilhem 
(1989) points out that the Latin word norma means a carpenter’s square, thus 
a straight and true angle which does not deviate in any direction. Already, in 
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this general formulation, it is clear how the concept of the normal easily glides 
between, or rather unites, an ideal and something actually existing and how 
elusive and fluid the meaning of “the normal” therefore is. This means that 
normativity does not express the soul of a people and cannot be seen as an 
inner essence contained within a population, nor even as a social construction 
that a population can rightfully see as its own (Fahlgren et al. 2016). In order 
to ensure society’s continued existence, the population — along with its 
reproductivity, mortality, health, hygiene, etc. — is controlled and moulded 
through various forms of normalizing power techniques. Many societal 
institutions have important normalizing functions, for example the family, 
school, healthcare, the police and social services. In this way, “the normal” is 
shaped in specific contexts and thereby creates both opportunities and 
restrictions with regard to people’s actions, identities and ideas, both in the 
form of privilege and obvious positions of power and in the form of 
repression and discrimination. 
Modern states equate citizenship with nationality, thus normalizing 
nationality as a part of the essence of citizenship. Here, it is possible to draw 
a parallel with Balibar’s (2008) discussion of the relationship between nation 
and citizenship, in which the nation-state does not necessarily in itself 
constitute a community but should instead be viewed as a structure making it 
possible for certain communities to arise. In his essay, “Citizenship without 
community”, Balibar (2004) discussed that the universal meaning of human 
rights is contaminated by the fact that real rights are still connected to 
citizenship and the national state. Today’s immigrant-politics show, according 
to Balibar, how the universalism of the national state is in conflict with itself, 
and how the community of citizens actually is grounded in discrimination 
(Balibar 2004, 64). In this sense it is possible to claim that Balibar takes the 
step into opening the black box of community asking what “the speculative 
concept of community means” (Balibar 2004, 65). Asking questions about the 
generic notion of the common is, we would say, to ask questions about what 
is actually normalised under the heading of citizenship communities is also a 
questioning of community grounded in an “inside” and an “outside”. Balibar 
thinks that community could be thought differently, and not in the simple 
dichotomy of including/excluding arguing that it is not exclusion that forms 
the deepest level of alienation but, in a certain way, inclusion itself insofar as 
it goes hand in hand with a normative fetishization (förtingligande) of being-
in-common (Balibar 2004, 69). In the context studied here, there are two such 
structures orbiting one another; one Sweden the nation-state, with its Swedish 
citizenry, and the other the European Union with its EU citizens. Balibar also 
points out the paradox inherent in the nation-state in that, on the one hand, 
it played a key role in creating and facilitating the idea of universal human 
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rights while, on the other, its very existence makes it possible for us to ignore 
the universality of those rights (Balibar 1994). When human rights, as is so 
often the case in the context of the welfare state, are linked to civil rights, 
those who do not belong to the citizenry are also excluded from their human 
rights. Exclusion is thus a fundamental aspect of the nation-state, one which 
not only creates a divide but demands that this divide be defended. Therefore, 
it is also important as a researcher to attempt to understand how those 
working within the framework of such institutions think about and view the 
various issues. As in the case on which this chapter is based, where we 
approach local government officials and politicians in order to investigate how 
they describe their own and their municipality’s work on the issue of 
vulnerable EU citizens. 
Approach and analysis 
One approach that is well-suited to reviewing and revealing 
normalization processes in relation to how politicians and officials discuss 
their municipality’s treatment of vulnerable EU citizens is Bacchi’s (2009) 
critical policy analysis. This means that we see policy creation or the lack of 
policy on certain issues, as an important instrument of control that therefore 
requires analysis and discussion, instead of something taken for granted or 
viewed as “neutral”. Bacchi identifies three interconnected and overlapping 
kinds of effects. Firstly, there are the discursive effects which follow from the 
limits imposed on what can be said and who can say it, when and where and 
with what authority and what is left silent. Thus “the problem representations 
and the discourses that frame them make it difficult to think differently” 
(Bacchi 2009, 16) closing off and leaving alternative ways unexplored. 
Secondly, there are the subjectification effects i.e. the ways in which subjects 
and subjectivities are constituted in discourse. Discourses make certain subject 
positions available — stigmatizing some and “exonerating others and keeping 
change within limits” (Bacchi 2009, 42). Bacchi draws attention to dividing 
practices, for example, unemployed versus employed or Swedish citizens 
versus EU citizens and how these can create members of the targeted groups 
as responsible for the problem. This may work to disempower those targeted, 
drawing attention away from the gendered, racialized and disabling structures 
which shape the possibilities of their lives and reinforce the existing power 
relations. Thirdly, there are what Bacchi calls the lived effects i.e. the material 
impact of problem representations. Policy representations of problems are 
also materially affecting our lives (Bacchi 2009, 18). This deals with focusing 
on what is represented as “the problem” in a specific issue; on the common 
assumptions behind this specific representation of the problem. It is also a 
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matter of analysing what remains unproblematized and whether it is possible 
to approach “the problem” in some other way. At the same time, it is an 
analysis that clearly focuses on the lived effects created by the representation 
of the problem and on how this representation of the problem is produced, 
disseminated and defended. This means that we as researchers not only 
analyse those solutions that the policies, politicians and officials state that they 
wish to achieve but that we also critically search for the assumptions on which 
the formulation of the problem is based. Such an approach helps to identify 
how identity categories and target groups are constituted. Bacchi (2009) 
contends that the state, through its policy procedures and actions, is an active 
participant in the creation of constructs, stereotypes and subject positions; the 
construction of the problem having consequences for those individuals a 
policy is aimed at. 
The material in this chapter is based on 15 qualitative interviews with 
9 officials and 6 politicians where selection was made based on the two 
principles of snowball sampling, the interview subjects position and 
nomination (Faraquharson 2005). One municipality in Västernorrland 
declined to participate in the study on the grounds that the issue of vulnerable 
EU citizens was an issue seen as not currently affecting the municipality (Ek 
et al. 2017). All respondents were contacted via email or telephone and asked 
if they would be willing to participate in the study. The interviews were 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. The interviews have been open 
discussions touching on, among other things: the relevance of the issue in the 
municipality; whether it was something that in the interview subject’s 
experience was on the political agenda; and the initiatives underway for the 
group — with the emphasis on the respondent’s reflections and thoughts 
regarding the municipality’s handling of vulnerable EU citizens. 
In order to study how problems are represented, we gave no precise 
definition during the interviews of what “problem” or “issue” the 
municipalities should/could/must address, rather this was allowed to develop 
through the respondents’ own stories and was thereby defined by them. The 
quotes presented in the text should be viewed as illustrations of those 
tendencies we found in the interview material. 
Categorization, problem representation and solutions 
Based on the analysis we carried out, it appears that the category EU 
citizen, and specifically vulnerable EU citizen, is not yet normalized. Those 
we interviewed searched for their own comparisons and other categories and 
explicitly called attention to the absence of established ways of understanding 
the current situation. Many wished that somebody, perhaps SALAR, would 
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produce a national regulatory framework that defines their room for 
manoeuvre and how they should go about doing the “right” thing. They are 
currently left to reach their own judgements on how to interpret legislation 
and regulations and to define what is and is not their responsibility, all without 
any praxis to fall back on. They are looking for order and attempting to 
legitimize the actions of their municipalities through whatever discourses they 
have to hand. In the search for “order” they use categories such as vulnerable 
EU citizen versus Swedish citizens in order to interpret the legislative 
regulations regarding rights and this becomes a dividing practice (Bacchi 2009) 
that upholds and reinforces stigmatisation and differences.  
In the process of attempting to understand and interpret the situation, 
the respondents normalize and reproduce certain discourses. It is for example 
clear that, in the day-to-day life of officials and politicians, national and 
Swedish citizenship takes precedence and this is continually normalized in the 
limitations imposed on European citizenship. If, for example, we attempt to 
see which communities the two orbiting citizenships give rise to, we can see 
that it is the Swedish citizenship that forms the basis for the invocation of any 
human rights, rather than the European. The community that European 
citizenship gives rise to is linked to categories such as guest workers or 
tourists. Equating the group of vulnerable EU citizens to guest workers is 
done for a variety of purposes, both to declare the importance of freedom of 
movement in relation to work and in order to prove the impossibility of 
understanding the group through any of the existing and available categories. 
One of the respondents problematized this point of view: 
[…] these are of course people that we here in Sweden treat in much the 
same way as a 19-year-old girl or guy working as a bartender on Cos; behave 
yourself or pay for your own journey home, or ring your mum. Which is of 
course one way to handle it but do we have a greater problem in as much as 
they have no parents to call who can send a ticket, or money for a ticket. 
(Official 2) 
To emphasize the importance of work shows how the normalization 
process produces a morality associated with economic rationality, and 
similarly with the idea that work is the only basis for inclusion; something 
which in turn creates exclusion and inequality. Discussion regarding EU 
citizens and their relationship to other reference categories is characterized by 
the difficulty respondents have in understanding the category vulnerable EU 
citizens and how they search for ways to deal with this. In their search for 
methods of understanding the category, normalization becomes increasingly 
transparent as reference categories such as tourist and guest worker are used to 
meet an almost exaggerated need to state the importance of the normal as 
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opposed to the abnormal. This is also true of the need to invoke the 
individual’s freedom of choice with regard to their stay in the municipality. 
Depending on how the categorization or construct creation of the 
group was carried out, the officials and politicians we interviewed often sought 
support in other categories in order to legitimize their attitude to the group. 
In situations where their vulnerability was foregrounded, reference was often 
made to the dealing with other vulnerable groups, such as homeless Swedish 
citizens or asylum seekers. When on the other hand the emphasis was on the 
municipality’s areas of responsibility and “vulnerability”, other categories were 
referenced, such as tourists and guest workers. The problem representation 
with the focus on the categorisation where citizenship becomes important 
puts the issue with vulnerability in the background and rights associated with 
citizenship becomes more prominent. 
A few municipalities in Västernorrland have implemented initiatives 
in the form of shelters during the winter months. Several respondents 
expressed the wish to have a shelter but refer to the difficulty in justifying this 
as, if a shelter is to exist in the municipality, it would have to be open to both 
homeless Swedish citizens, including substance abusers, and to the vulnerable 
group of EU citizens. 
If the problem increases and we need to take action such as opening a 
shelter, in my opinion at least, we should not prioritize EU citizens but rather 
it must be aimed at everyone who finds themselves in a bad situation. 
(Official 4) 
The result of the comparisons and similarities used by respondents 
when speaking about vulnerable EU citizens also leads to different groups 
being pitted against one another, where the problem representation (Bacchi 
2009) makes impossible to separate one group from another, as done in the 
quote above. This can also be understood with the help of the nation-state 
paradox pointed out by Balibar (2009), in which human rights become a 
question of civil rights that are vouchsafed to some but not to others. 
In our study, we have seen a marked tendency toward this attitude, 
with vulnerable EU citizens often being placed outside of the established 
society, and that this power relationship between the “normal” (Swedish 
citizens) and the “other” (vulnerable EU citizens) can to a certain extent be 
maintained through approach the adopted by the State and municipalities. 
Some of the more obvious examples of this deal with how legislation, for 
example, sustains categorizations and indeed reinforces them by pointing out 
something (or someone) as an “unreasonable burden to the social assistance 
system” (Swedish Aliens Act 2005:716), or where behaviour associated with 
certain groups is characterized as illegal or troubling. In as much as 
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institutional stakeholders, in this case local government politicians and 
officials, exercise some kind of control over the population, they also 
participate in the creation of both opportunities and limitations for how a 
municipality may act on the issue of EU migrants. In any such process, the 
exclusion of vulnerable EU citizens becomes entrenched as, in some sense, 
they become differentiated from groups with a natural affiliation to society 
and risk remaining outside of that society due to this systematic exclusion. 
Municipal officials and their action space 
As we have previously mentioned, what also emerges in the various 
ways of understanding EU citizens and their position as presented above, is 
the experience of politicians and officials regarding legislation and their 
perceived freedom of action, particularly in view of the lack of existing and 
coherent guidelines. One of the few policy documents that the various 
municipal representatives feel that they can fall back on is national coordinator 
Martin Valfridsson’s report (SOU 2016:6) which refers to a interpretation of 
the situation with a focus on the legal perspective, what must the 
municipalities do instead of posing the question what can the municipalities 
do. The following quote is typical of how municipalities’ representatives 
report their use of the document to both support the legitimacy of the 
initiatives they have implemented and to motivate why they have decided to 
not take any action. 
[…] at an individual level, we must of course make a judgment on those who 
make their way here precisely as we would anyone else and yes, if they require 
acute assistance, and of course only that is dealt with in this [Valfridsson’s 
report], acute assistance, possibly a shelter and then only in an emergency 
but not to build up any organization which is of course what’s written here, 
that’s certainly not what he [Valfridsson] recommends. (Official 1) 
When ambiguous or indeed no guidelines exist, a situation arises in 
which it is unreasonable to expect officials to exercise authority. An official 
can only act based on their given assignment and, without any clear guidelines 
as to how a situation is to be dealt with, reaching a decision is problematic. At 
the same time, we would like to stress that there was also an ambivalence in 
the interviews. In a number of interviews the respondents take the position 
that, while they accept the vulnerable position in which the EU citizens find 
themselves, they cannot see any room for manoeuvre on their own part with 
regard to doing anything about it. In the few instances where it was expressed 
that there was some leeway for a more humanitarian attitude, this was in 
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relation to precarious accommodation situations, primarily involving children. 
Respondents then often spoke of the harsh northern winters in which it was 
not sustainable for vulnerable EU citizens to sleep in either cars or tents. 
We had a fairly lively discussion for a period due to the fact that more and 
more EU citizens were coming here and it got extremely cold and when they 
began to arrive they primarily lived in cars that stood parked here and there. 
I suppose the feeling was that we didn’t want anyone freezing to death in 
our municipality. (Politician 3) 
In the respondent’s opinion, this feeling of reluctance to see anyone 
freeze to death is given as one of the driving forces behind the municipality’s 
decision to establish a shelter. Similarly, the matter of what is “best for the 
children” is negotiated whereby the child’s best is either about the right to 
schooling — or lack thereof — or, as in the quote below, how they live and 
under what conditions they spend their nights. 
[…] of course, we wouldn’t accept that a Swedish citizen, several of them, 
turned up with their children and moved into a shelter […], it would be the 
subject of an inquiry and probably the children would be taken into care. But 
we allow another group, these people, to do so. (Politician 1) 
The solution to the problem as presented in the quote above is that 
children living in a shelter, or in other insecure living conditions while staying 
with their parents in Sweden, are living an unsafe existence and must therefore 
be the subject of an inquiry by the social services in accordance with the Social 
Services Act. According to the respondents, when it comes to children living 
under socially vulnerable conditions they have clear freedom of action under 
the provisions of the Social Services Act and SALAR guidelines. In such cases, 
the final recourse with regard to the problem of children’s unsafe living 
conditions is that the child be taken into care. What becomes clear is that the 
child’s situation within this vulnerable group is given special status and, in 
some sense, a discursive separation takes place between the child and the 
group of vulnerable EU citizens. All children must have the same rights and, 
in this case, all children are equal irrespective of citizenship. What becomes 
“unproblematized” (Bacchi 2009) is the issue of human rights and their 
association with citizenship in relation to grown up EU citizens. This problem 
representation of rights as connected to Swedish citizenship is a dividing 
practice which produces stigmatisation and precarious living conditions. 
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The limits of welfare: normalization, exclusion and grievable lives 
— concluding comments 
The study we have conducted shows that, in the absence of common 
guidelines on how vulnerable EU citizens should be dealt with, a 
normalization has taken place of Swedish or perhaps “municipal” citizenship 
as the basis of the right to welfare. The dilemma of this conditional welfare 
becomes increasingly apparent as the officials tasked with navigating its 
complex backwaters struggle in the absence of policy guidelines and are 
instead directed to attempt to “solve” each situation one case at a time. The 
respondents’ descriptions most commonly refer to the delimitative and 
prohibitive aspects of their work. Thus, it is Swedish citizenship that provides 
you with access to the community represented by the municipality while, at 
the same time, it is this community which must be guarded (cf. Balibar 1994). 
Prohibition is commonly motivated by a concern for the municipality’s 
citizens; that they should be “spared” the sight of social exclusion and/or 
begging and that, for their sake, public order must be maintained. Based on 
such assumptions, bylaws against begging are prepared, evictions carried out 
and other prohibitive measures put in place that set the tone for how 
municipalities should respond to vulnerable EU citizens as a group. In many 
municipalities, the spontaneous settlements, caravan and camping sites that 
sprung up have now been closed down by the local authorities. When the 
respondents speak about this, they describe the closing down of these camps 
not only as a relocation of EU citizens but also as if the matter of social 
exclusion among EU citizens has ceased to be a municipal problem once the 
settlements has been closed down. This narrative links the problem itself to 
those non-sanctioned settlements within the municipality’s geographical 
borders. It is the settlements and their flaws, rather than the inhabitants’ social 
exclusion in a broader context, that are seen as problematic and become in 
themselves the problem. 
Significant to the material on which this chapter is based is a question 
we asked during the interviews regarding dreams or visions concerning the 
group of vulnerable EU citizens and the situation they find themselves in. 
Here, the respondents were given the chance to respond to how they would 
wish the situation to look a number of years down the line, without in any real 
way needing to consider economic or other structural and political factors. 
This might seem like a trivial question but the answers received show where 
the responsibility for social exclusion, according to the respondents, should 
lie. The visions presented proved to be of a wish for change to take place in 
the “homelands”, i.e. Romania and Bulgaria, and that initiatives such as access 
to education and jobs, along with a reduction in discrimination, will occur 
 37 TNTeF (2017) 7.2 
there. These visions also often contained a desire for the European Union to 
play a greater role in the issue of social exclusion. The visions indicate all too 
clearly a desire that our responsibility and room for manoeuvre regarding 
social exclusion can and should reside elsewhere than within the framework 
of Sweden’s municipal organizations. In the municipal context, it is local 
government officials and politicians who set the meaning and limitations of 
what EU citizenship implies. The conditions for different EU citizens thus 
becomes a fundamental aspect of the nation-state that not only creates divides 
but also demands that these divides be defended (Balibar 2001). 
One may ask a question about what will be better and for who if the 
vulnerable EU citizens leave the municipalities of Västernorrland, the answer 
according to the people we interviewed appears to be that it will be better for 
the municipality, for citizens of the municipality — who will be spared the 
sight of beggars — it will decrease the risk of “nationalist opinion” and, for 
some of the municipalities, it will reduce public spending. However, what 
remains unsaid or silenced by the discourse (cf. Bacchi 2009) is that it will not 
reduce these people’s social exclusion but rather simply move it elsewhere, 
that it will reinforce nationalist discourses on the enforcement of borders and 
that there is a difference between people. Through these norms of inclusion 
or exclusion, people are constituted through dividing practices (Bacchi 2009) 
as those who has ‘the right to have rights’ and those who has not (cf. Arendt 
1968). Something which unsought leads us to a question raised by Butler 
(2010), namely — when is life grievable? According to Butler, throughout 
history different categories of people, and their lives, have been separated and 
ranked; rendering certain human lives less human, less important and thereby 
harder or even impossible to grieve. In order to delineate grievable lives from 
non-grievable, borders must be drawn between individuals. These borders 
create space for understanding but at the same time they create and maintain 
norms. This in turn leads to differing reactions to attacks aimed at different 
ethnic groups or individuals (Butler 2010). These norms, according to Butler’s 
reasoning, lead us to the conclusion that certain lives can be considered 
worthier of preservation, protection and grief. As also pointed out in the 
introduction to this study, in the interviews it is for example common to 
associate the group of vulnerable EU citizens with being of Roma heritage. 
This also leads to the group being described using a number of stereotyped 
characteristics that are often applied to Roma. This normalizes a 
stigmatisation of the group which, as it were, confines them to a way of life 
with ethnically and culturally related occupations and to remain in social 
exclusion. We also know that Roma have been persecuted for many hundreds 
of years and that this continues to this day. Butler speaks of the displaced, 
those whose lives are not perceived as grievable or valuable, those who are 
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not viewed as adequate victims, those who are forced to bear the burden of 
vulnerability, disenfranchisement and the loss of human worth (Butler 2010). 
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